This study provides evidence regarding the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses by investigating the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking in the property-liability insurance industry. The structure of guaranty funds provides incentives for owners to encourage insurer risk-taking. However, the ex post funding mechanism and incompleteness of guaranty funds may create monitoring incentives that inhibit risk-taking. Moreover, the extent to which managers engage in risk-taking may depend on how well their interests are aligned with those of the owners. The empirical results provide support for the risk-subsidy hypothesis and demonstrate the essential link between insider ownership and risk-taking.
INTRODUCTION
The institutional details of insurance industry guaranty funds have the potential to create competing incentives regarding risk-taking by insurers. Guaranty funds use an ex post financing mechanism to assess surviving insurers for the losses generated by insolvent insurers, and, at the same time, the assessments do not account for the riskiness of the insurers. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) use the risk-neutrality and ex post funding of guaranty funds to develop two hypotheses regarding the impact of guaranty funds on the risk-taking behavior of insurers. They refer to these hypotheses as the risk-subsidy hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. They examine the relative strength of these hypotheses, and their empirical evidence leads them to conclude in favor of risk-subsidy.
This study complements the work of Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) and addresses several additional issues. For stock market-based measures of risk, the evidence shows that the risk-subsidy hypothesis appears to hold, and the extent of risk-subsidy-related behavior is directly related to insider ownership. This point is related to the David H. Downs and David W. Sommer are Assistant Professors at the Terry College of Business, University of Georgia. The authors would like to thank Joseph Sinkey and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. ownership structure hypothesis advanced by Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) .
1 In addition, the authors are able to validate this result by exploiting the option characteristics of the risk-subsidy. Specifically, the study shows that the relation between risk and ownership is stronger for insurers whose put option is closer to being in the money. Finally, as monitoring and risk-subsidy are not mutually exclusive, the authors attempt to avoid a complete dismissal of the monitoring hypothesis by examining a series of piecewise linear relations between risk and ownership. This approach effectively relaxes the condition under which the authors might conclude in favor of the existence of monitoring. The results appear to have important implications for the effectiveness of guaranty funds and other financial institution insurance programs.
BACKGROUND, THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS, HYPOTHESES
The Insurance Guaranty Fund System During the years 1969 to 1981, all states enacted laws to establish guaranty funds to protect the policyholders of insolvent insurance companies. 2 The protection provided by these state guaranty funds, however, is far from complete.
3 For instance, the funds typically limit the maximum amount that can be recovered to $300,000 per claim ($100,000 in some states), including all loss adjustment and defense costs. Deductibles are also common. In addition, certain lines of insurance typically have no coverage (e.g., reinsurance and marine insurance), and some states provide no protection for commercial insureds that exceed a particular net worth limit. Beyond these restrictions, payments from a guaranty fund are likely to be delayed compared to payments from a solvent insurer. In addition, guaranty funds do not provide reimbursement for the risk management services that the solvent insurer would have provided.
The funding method used by insurance guaranty fund programs is also very important. Guaranty fund programs are funded on a post-insolvency assessment basis. 4 Thus, surviving insurers are responsible for paying the guaranty fund obligations created when one of their peers becomes insolvent. In addition, the assessments are set on a risk neutral basis. Each insurer's assessment is based on the amount of premium written by the firm in the state and is independent of the risk level of the firm being assessed.
Theoretical Discussion
As demonstrated by Merton (1977) for banks for insurers, fixed premium government guarantees of liabilities create an incentive for financial institutions to increase risk. The owners of the firm have a put option on the firm's assets with a strike price equal to the value of the firm's liabilities. Simple option pricing comparative statics demonstrate that the value of the put option is greater for more risky firms. The intuition is straightforward and follows directly from the asymmetric payoff structure of an option. If an insurer engages in risky activities and the outcome is favorable, then the firm's owners receive the benefit. If the outcome is unfavorable, the owner's liability is limited to the equity value of the firm, and any shortfall is absorbed by the guaranty funds and consumers. Insurers are not penalized for risk-taking through the guaranty fund system since assessments are not riskbased. Additionally, the extent to which they are penalized for risk by consumers is limited because consumers bear only a portion of any insolvency costs, with guaranty funds paying most of the costs. Thus, the incentive to take on high levels of risk may be strong. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) call the argument that insurers increase risk to take advantage of the put option the risk-subsidy hypothesis. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) discuss the risk-subsidy hypothesis in terms of asset risk only. demonstrates that for property-liability insurers, the correct risk parameter includes components for asset risk, liability risk, and the correlation among assets and liabilities. For this reason, the authors rely on market-based risk measures to reflect this asset-liability portfolio risk concept. This contribution seems to be noteworthy given the vital importance of liability risk in the propertyliability industry. Liability risk has been identified as the most important cause of property-liability insurer insolvencies of recent decades (A.M. Best Company, 1991).
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The option effect is potentially not the only influence on the risk-taking behavior of insurers. Due to the post-insolvency assessment funding mechanism of guaranty funds, it is argued that insurers have an incentive to monitor each other and alert regulators to potentially excessive risk-taking by peers. 6 This monitoring may pre- 5 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has recognized the central importance of liability risk in the recently implemented risk-based capital formula, in which the largest component is liability (underwriting) risk. The underwriting risk charges account for about two-thirds of industry-wide risk-based capital, compared to about twenty percent for asset risk charges and the remainder for credit risk and off-balance sheet risk (Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1995) . 6 Pre-funded assessments might be viewed as simply a tax that would be unaffected by monitoring the risk of other firms. Hall (1998) argues that monitoring incentives are enhanced when assessments vary each year based on actual losses for the year. Arguably, though, even the level of pre-funded assessments would ultimately be determined by actual insolvency costs, albeit more indirectly than with post-funded assessments. Thus, moving to a pre-funded system may not entirely eliminate peer-monitoring incentives. Additionally, fixed-rate assessments may in themselves create monitoring incentives, regardless of their timing. When assessments are not based on risk, high-risk insurers are being undercharged for their guaranty fund protection and low-risk insurers are being overcharged. Low-risk insurers may have incentives to pressure regulators to act against high-risk insurers in an attempt to reduce this cross-subsidization.
clude insurers from taking on high levels of risk and, hence, from increasing the value of the option. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) call this the monitoring hypothesis. Another motivation for peer monitoring of risk is the potential contagion effects of financial problems among insurers (Fenn and Cole, 1994) . 7 In addition to the monitoring by peers on which Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) focus, other potential sources of monitoring exist. Regulators put a great deal of effort into monitoring the activities of insurers and attempting to limit excessive risk-taking. In addition, because of the incompleteness of guaranty funds, Cummins and Sommer (1996) argue that consumers have an incentive to monitor the risk of their insurer. They may perform this monitoring themselves or, very often, may rely on the insurance intermediaries with whom they work to perform the monitoring. Insurance agents and brokers expend considerable effort monitoring the financial strength of the insurers they place business with since these intermediaries expose themselves to potential legal liability if they negligently place business with an insurer that later becomes insolvent. Evidence of consumer-driven monitoring includes the widespread use of rating agencies that evaluate the claims-paying ability of insurers. In addition, Sommer (1996) , Cummins and Danzon (1997) , and Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) provide evidence that firms which take on more risk receive lower premiums for the insurance they sell. Finally, reinsurers monitor the financial condition of the insurers from whom they assume business. Thus, it appears that risk-taking behavior of insurers is likely to be monitored by other firms in the industry, by regulators, by consumers and insurance intermediaries, and by reinsurers. 8 In this study, the term monitoring hypothesis encompasses the collective influence of all of these parties. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) examine the risk-subsidy hypothesis versus the monitoring hypothesis by studying changes in the asset mix of insurers before and after the adoption of state guaranty fund programs. They find that stock insurers shifted their asset allocations toward riskier asset categories (specifically, from bonds and other assets to stocks) after guaranty funds were introduced. They interpret these results as supportive of the risk-subsidy hypothesis and inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis. Separately, they find no evidence of a similar shift in asset risk by mutual insurers. This differential reaction across insurer ownership structures is consistent with the notion that inseparability of residual and fixed claims in mutuals controls the risk-taking incentives created by guaranty funds.
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This study further examines the competing effects of the risk-subsidy hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis for stock insurers. It accomplishes this by taking a different perspective than Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) . This analysis does not view risk-taking across a particular event (e.g., enactment of state guaranty funds over a 7 Of course, there are also disincentives for insurers to monitor each other, including the cost of monitoring and free rider problems (Lee, Mayers, and Smith, 1997) . In addition, as Hall (1998) points out, insurers lack any formal mechanism to force regulators to take action against a risky competitor, and such efforts may raise antitrust concerns. 8 Brewer, Mondschean, and Strahan (1997) examine the impact of monitoring in the life insurance industry. They conclude that the tax treatment of state guaranty fund assessments influences the monitoring of life insurer risk-taking. 9 See Esty (1997) for a discussion of organizational form and risk-taking in the savings and loan industry.
number of years). In addition, whereas Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) begin by pooling mutual and stock companies, this study is quick to acknowledge the overwhelming influence that the separation of claims would have on risk-taking, and focuses instead on publicly traded stock insurers. The advantages of the perspective are that it permits the authors to control for changes in the insurers' investment opportunity set by analyzing firms over a common time period, and to test the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking. The advantage of employing publicly traded firms is the emphasis on market-based measures of risk. This point is important as it addresses what Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) refer to as their joint hypothesis; namely, the existence of risk-subsidy behavior and the ad hoc specification of a ranking of asset risk, particularly over their thirteen year examination period (1969 to 1981) . In addition, as discussed earlier, asset risk is only one component of total risk for property-liability insurers, and arguably not the most important component.
The goal of this study is to examine the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses of Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) in another setting, in turn, allowing for additional evidence in support of either hypothesis. The perspective and focus of this work will contribute to the understanding of the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions.
The authors examine these hypotheses by investigating the relation between insider ownership and risk. It was argued above that stockholders of property-liability insurers benefit from high risk-taking by the firm because of the implicit put option created by guaranty funds. Since firm managers are the agents of shareholders, they should seek the level of riskiness desired by the shareholders. However, agency theory argues that managers may often act in their own interests rather than in the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Berle and Means, 1932) . The long-run value of the nondiversifiable, firm-specific human capital of managers may be maximized by ensuring the survival of the firm rather than seeking to maximize the value of the firm. Thus, managers may tend to act in a riskaverse manner even if this is not in the best interests of stockholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , among others, have recognized that one of the ways in which the agency conflicts between firm owners and firm managers can be reduced is by giving managers an ownership stake in the firm, since this better aligns the interests of the owners and the managers. If it is true that owners and managers generally have differing risk preferences, with owners preferring higher levels of risk than managers, then as the interests of managers become more closely aligned with those of stockholders, the managers' actions should reflect more risk-taking. As described further in the following section, this hypothesis has been tested in the banking industry by Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) , who find a positive relation between the percent of a firm's outstanding stock held by insiders and the level of risk of the financial institution. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) investigate the relation between risk-taking and ownership structure in the context of stock versus mutual insurers. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) also look at the relation between ownership structure and risk-taking, focusing on the level of insider ownership in banks. Analogous to the case of guaranty funds for insurers, FDIC insurance provides a bank's owners with a put option which
Hypotheses
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has a value that is increasing in risk. Hence, owners are hypothesized to prefer higher levels of risk than the risk-averse managers of the bank. As insider ownership increases, the interests of bank owners and managers become more aligned, and thus risk-taking is expected to increase. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) find evidence of a positive and significant relation between bank risk-taking and insider ownership.
As discussed in the previous section, insurers hold a put option provided by state guaranty funds. However, because of the incomplete protection provided by guaranty funds and their post-assessment funding method, peer insurers and consumers may have stronger monitoring incentives than those present in banking. 10 Thus, the relation between risk-taking and insider ownership may differ for insurers compared to banks, depending on the relative strength of risk-subsidy behavior versus the effects of monitoring. The first hypothesis, referred to as the risk-subsidy hypothesis, states:
H1.1: The effects of risk-subsidy in the insurance industry will result in a positive relation between risk-taking and insider ownership.
This hypothesis parallels that of Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and relies on the increasing alignment of interests between owners and managers as the stake of the latter increases. As managers' interests become more aligned with those of owners, managers have more incentive to take advantage of the risk-subsidy provided through the guaranty funds by increasing risk.
The alternative hypothesis of interest is the monitoring hypothesis. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) argue that the monitoring incentives created by the introduction of expost assessment guaranty funds might offset the risk-taking incentives of the funds, with the end result being no change in risk or even lower risk after adoption of the funds. Given the different nature of this study, the analogous argument for monitoring leading to a negative relation between risk-taking and insider ownership does not seem plausible. 11 However, monitoring (by competitors, regulators, rating agencies, brokers/agents, consumers, and reinsurers) may act to mitigate the subsidy incentive for increased risk-taking. Thus, the alternative hypothesis is: H1.2: The effect of monitoring in the insurance industry offsets risk-subsidy incentives and results in no discernible relation between risk-taking and insider ownership. 10 The incompleteness of guaranty fund protection was discussed earlier. It should be noted that FDIC insurance does not provide complete protection of banking customers either. However, FDIC protection is very broad, with $100,000 coverage for each account. In addition, FDIC coverage is prominently promoted and relatively simple for consumers to understand. State insurance guaranty funds are much less well-known to the public, much less promoted by insurers than FDIC is by banks, and their rules are much more complicated for consumers. The reality of the contrast manifests itself in the extensive use of private rating agencies in the insurance industry compared to the banking industry. The strong demand for these solvency ratings would not likely exist if consumers felt adequately protected by guaranty funds. 11 Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) look at changes in risk-taking that occurred when guaranty funds were introduced. Because the new guaranty system created peer monitoring incentives that did not previously exist, the authors argue that this structural change may actually have led to a decrease in risk-taking behavior. Their results do not support this hypothesis.
A finding of no relation between risk-taking and insider ownership could imply that monitoring is a function of the observable characteristic of insider ownership. However, the authors' test will not be able to discern whether such a finding means that monitoring offsets risk-subsidy incentives or simply means that the risk-subsidy hypothesis does not hold.
The influence of monitoring versus risk-subsidy incentives can be further explored by examining another set of hypotheses. Independent of testing the first set of hypotheses, tests can be performed to determine whether the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking is stronger for insurers with lower capital ratios. 12 The following argument again relies on the premise that guaranty funds provide the owners of the firm with an option. It is well known that as the value of the underlying asset of an option grows closer to the strike price, the impact of volatility on the value of the option grows increasingly strong. The underlying asset of the option is the asset value of the firm, and the strike price is the value of firm liabilities. Thus, as the values of assets and liabilities grow closer (i.e., the firm becomes less capitalized), stockholders benefit more from increased risk (Furlong and Keeley, 1989) . Empirical evidence of this has been found in the savings and loan industry by Brewer and Mondschean (1994) and Brewer (1995) , who find that shifts to riskier activities have a stronger positive impact on the stock returns of low-capital S&Ls than on stock returns of highly capitalized S&Ls. It would be expected, then, that stockholders in thinly capitalized financial institutions would have an even greater desire for risktaking than would stockholders of well-capitalized institutions.
13 Consistent with this argument, evidence of a risk-subsidy effect should be stronger for thinly capitalized firms than for well-capitalized firms, leading to the following hypothesis: H2.1: The relation between risk-taking and insider ownership in the insurance industry is stronger for thinly capitalized firms relative to insurers in general.
However, monitors presumably recognize that the incentive for risk-taking increases as capitalization decreases. Thus, they are likely to focus their monitoring activities more intensely on thinly capitalized firms. If, additionally, monitors also recognize the increased risk-taking propensity of firms with higher levels of insider ownership, they would particularly focus on firms with both low capitalization and high insider ownership. If this is the case, low capitalization may actually weaken the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking, as monitoring dominates the heightened risk-subsidy incentives. This leads to an alternative hypothesis:
H2.2: The relation between risk-taking and insider ownership in the insurance industry is weaker for thinly capitalized firms relative to insurers in general.
A test of Hypothesis 2.2 is a strong form test of the monitoring hypothesis.
Up to this point the authors have assumed that the interests of shareholders and managers continue to be aligned as the ownership stake of insiders increases. Other studies have noted that the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking may be nonlinear; however, these studies are not entirely consistent in addressing the rationale for this nonlinearity.
14 The final hypothesis considers the potential role of monitoring in addressing the nonlinearity between insider ownership and risk-taking. As in the case of capitalization, regulators and industry peers may experience less measurement error in observing ownership structure relative to directly monitoring risk-taking. Consequently, if monitors pay particular attention to firms with high levels of insider ownership, the monitoring effect may mitigate risk-subsidy incentives above some level of ownership. This leads to the following hypothesis: H3: Above some intermediate level of insider ownership, the relation between ownership and risk-taking will be concave.
In effect, this serves as a weak form test of the monitoring hypothesis as it does not rely on the monitoring incentives to overwhelm the risk-subsidy incentives. This test only asks whether monitoring mollifies risk-taking through the observable characteristic of ownership structure. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) is used as the starting point for their model specification and empirical approach. The dependent variables in each of the regressions to follow are all stock market-based measures of risk. The key variables on the right hand side of the equations measure the extent of insider ownership of the insurer's stock. In addition, two control variables are included in the model-size and capitalization.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
All property-liability insurers that were actively traded over the entire period of 1989 to 1995 are included in the sample. Each of the variables for the empirical analysis is calculated annually for the sample firms. The final sample includes 385 total observations (55 firms over seven years). All models are estimated using ordinary least squares regression with year dummy variables, as in Bagnini et al. (1994) .
Several measures of risk are employed, reflecting total, systematic, and nonsystematic risk. As pointed out by Bagnini et al. (1994) , whether insider ownership has a differential relation to systematic versus nonsystematic risk is an empirical question. Since it is not this study's objective to identify the appropriate return-generating process for insurer stock returns, the study follows the approach of Cummins and Harrington (1988) Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 1 . The average level of insider ownership across the 385 observations is 20.6 percent. The average size of these firms is $9.2 billion, and the mean capital-to-asset ratio is 0.25, which is higher than one finds for a sample of banks. This last point has some bearing on this study's definition of low capitalization. The sample consists of 55 property-liability stock insurers over the period 1989-1995 for a total of 385 observations. The independent variables are: INSIDE, the proportion of shares outstanding held by insiders of the firm; SIZE, the natural logarithm of the total assets; and CAPITAL, the firm's capital-to-asset ratio. † The mean and standard deviation of total assets are reported here for SIZE. In the correlation matrix and for all subsequent regressions, the variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 15 At the suggestion of an anonymous referee, the authors ran another set of regressions including a proxy for franchise value. The argument is that franchise value serves as a disincentive for risk-taking, since it is lost in the event of bankruptcy. As in Keeley (1990) , the authors used q = (market value of equity + book value of liabilities)/(book value of assets) as the proxy for franchise value. For the total risk and nonsystematic risk equations, the coefficient on q was negative and significant, as expected. The inclusion of this variable had no meaningful impact on any of the other results. These results are available from the authors upon request.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Risk-Taking and Ownership
The baseline model relates each measure of firm risk to the level of insider ownership as well as the control variables and year dummies. Table 2 , columns 1 through 9. In Model 1 there is a positive and statistically significant relation between insider ownership and total risk. This finding can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the risk-subsidy hypothesis. As the interests of owners and managers become more aligned, insurers increase risk to raise the value of the implicit put option. While the result from Model 1 provides no support for the monitoring hypothesis, it is important to note that this does not mean that monitoring has no effect. All that can be concluded is that in this test the risk-subsidy effect subsumes any evidence of a monitoring effect. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) refer to this as a strong form test of the monitoring hypothesis.
The coefficients of the control variables for size and capitalization are also significant. Total risk is found to be negatively related to size, which is consistent with the idea that larger insurers have greater potential to diversify their assets and liabilities. Total risk is also negatively related to capitalization as expected (see Lev, 1974) .
Models 2 and 3 use the risk measures from the one-factor model. When the dependent variable is nonsystematic risk, the results are very similar to those obtained using total risk; namely, there is a significantly positive relation between insider ownership and risk. However, as also found in Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) for banks, the relation between systematic risk and insider ownership is insignificant. In this regression, size has no explanatory power, though systematic risk is significantly negatively related to the capital-asset ratio, which would be expected since leverage increases risk (see Mandelker and Rhee, 1984) . Models 4 to 6 use the risk measures obtained from the two-factor model estimated with the long yield series. Only the nonsystematic risk measure is significantly related to insider ownership. Nonsystematic risk is also significantly negatively related to insurer size and capital-asset ratio. With the market beta risk measure, the only significant variable is the capital-asset ratio. Thus, capitalization is negatively related to total risk, nonsystematic risk, and market risk (from the one-or two-factor models). For yield risk, the only significant relation found is for size, with the negative coefficient implying that size is positively related to yield risk. That is, larger property-liability insurers appear to have more mismatch between their assets and liabilities than do smaller insurers. To the authors' knowledge, this result has never been shown for property-liability insurers, though it is consistent with the findings of Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) for banks.
Models 7 to 9 use the risk measures obtained from the two-factor model based on the short yield series. Again, only the nonsystematic risk measure is significantly related [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . OLS parameter estimates and associated t statistics (in parentheses) are reported using nine market-based measures of risk. Total risk, σ s , is measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i in year t. The other risk measures are estimated either with a single-or two-factor model. They include three measures of market risk (β m for CAPM's single factor risk measure, and β mL and β mS for the market risk measures of the twoindex model estimated with long and short yields, respectively); yield risk for the two-index model (a long yield risk, β YL , and a short yield risk, β YS ); and three nonsystematic risk measures (σ ε for CAPM and σ εL and σ εS for the two-index model with long yield and short yield, respectively). The independent variables are INSIDE, the proportion of shares outstanding held by insiders of the firm; SIZE, the natural logarithm of the total assets; and CAPITAL, the firm's capital-to-asset ratio. The parameter estimates for the year dummy variables are not reported to conserve space.
* Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
to insider ownership. The control variable results are consistent with Models 4 to 6 for market risk and nonsystematic risk. However, for yield risk it is found that size is no longer significant but that the coefficient on the capital-asset ratio is positive and significant. This suggests that the less leveraged the insurer, the lower the yield risk as measured by the short-term yield factor. This is consistent with the results for total risk, nonsystematic risk, and market risk; namely, more leverage is associated with more risk. Table 3 shows the influence of capitalization on the relation between risk and insider ownership, exploiting the option characteristic of the firm. In these models, a variable called INSIDE*LOCAP is added to the right-hand side of the equation. This variable is an interaction between insider ownership and a dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is classified as a "low capitalization" firm, where low capitalization is defined as having a capital-to-asset ratio of less than or equal to 0.10. 16 Forty-four of the 385 total observations meet this criterion. The coefficient on the interaction variable (INSIDE*LOCAP) indicates the marginal effect of insider ownership in firms with low capitalization. As presented in hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2, the risk-subsidy hypothesis would imply a positive marginal effect, while the monitoring hypothesis would imply a negative marginal effect. The estimation equation is as follows: Model 1 shows the results for total risk. The coefficient on insider ownership is positive and significant, as was the case with Model 1 of Table 2 . Additionally, the positive and significant coefficient on the marginal effect variable of INSIDE*LOCAP suggests that the relation between risk and insider ownership is stronger for less capitalized firms. 17 This result provides yet more support for the risk-subsidy hypothesis. Although monitors may have reason to focus their attention on firms with low capitalization and high insider ownership, they do not prevent managers in these firms from increasing risk. Models 2 and 3 use the risk measures obtained from the one-factor model. As in Table  2 , the overall relation between risk and insider ownership is positive and significant for nonsystematic risk but insignificant for market risk. However, for low capitalized firms, the parameter estimate for the marginal effect is significant and positive for both nonsystematic and market risk. The market risk result is particularly interesting since it suggests that the implication of Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and of Table 2 [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . The variables are the same as those defined for Table 2 with the exception of the variable used to test the marginal effect. INSIDE*LOCAP is an interactive variable. It is the product of the INSIDE variable and a variable that takes the value one for all observations with a capitalization (CAPITAL) less than 0.10 and zero for all other capitalization values.
Marginal Effect of Low Capitalization
*Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
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results that insider ownership is unrelated to systematic risk is not correct for all firms. For thinly capitalized property-liability firms, at least, insider ownership is positively related to market risk, just as it is to total risk and nonsystematic risk. It would be quite interesting to investigate bank data using this approach to determine whether this result is unique to property-liability insurers or is more general. The results for the control variables are consistent with Table 2 .
Models 4 to 6 use the risk measures obtained from the two-factor model using the long yield. The results for market risk and nonsystematic risk are consistent with Models 2 and 3. Once again, market risk and insider ownership are positively related for low capitalization firms. By contrast, no significant relation is found between insider ownership and interest rate risk.
Models 7 to 9 use the risk measures obtained from the two-factor model using the short yield. The principal findings are consistent with Models 4 to 6, although there are some differences for control variables.
Piecewise Investigation
The final hypothesis presented earlier states that the relation between insider ownership and risk may be nonlinear because of the competing influences of the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses. This issue is explored in Tables 4 and 5 through the use of piecewise linear regressions. As in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , Table 4 reports the relation between total risk and ownership over various ranges of insider ownership. The ranges are defined by two breakpoints. Likewise, this study adopts Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1988) criteria of using the breakpoints yielding the lowest sum of squared errors for further analysis. The first breakpoint is fixed at 5 percent, which is standard in papers that look at the risk-ownership relation in a nonlinear context (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Bagnini et al., 1994) . 18 For the upper breakpoint (Z), results are presented for increments of 5 percent from 20 percent to 50 percent. The 45 percent breakpoint yields the highest adjusted R-squared of 38.14 percent. The estimation equation is as follows (see note to Table 4 Table 5 reports the results for the piecewise linear regression for all risk measures using the breakpoints of 5 percent and 45 percent. For comparison, Model 1 repeats the Table 4 result for total risk using the 5 percent and 45 percent breakpoints. A significant positive relation is found over the range from 5 percent to 45 percent, consistent with the result from Model 1 of Table 2 . For ownership levels above 45 percent, the point estimate of the relation between ownership and risk-taking is negative, although the t-statistic is not above the critical value for a 1 percent level of confidence. However, the authors did perform a test comparing the coefficients for 18 Initial breakpoints other than 5 percent were also investigated. Similar to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , none appeared to yield better results.
. 19 Consequently, the results for the middle and upper range support the hypothesis that while the risk-subsidy incentive dominates over the middle range of ownership, other factors offset this incentive once ownership rises above a certain level. This result provides weak evidence in support of the monitoring hypothesis. The outcome may be the result of monitors focusing their scrutiny on firms with high levels of insider ownership, preventing them from further exploiting their risk subsidy.
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Models 2 and 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9 use the risk measures obtained for the one-factor model, the two-factor model using the long yield, and the two-factor model using the short yield, respectively. As reported before, all the nonsystematic risk measures provide results very similar to those obtained with the total risk measure. In other words, for the middle range the relation between insider ownership and nonsystematic risk is significant and positive, and for the upper range it is insignificant. Likewise, no relation between insider ownership and any of the systematic risk measures is found.
As in all empirical work, some caveats deserve to be mentioned. Perhaps the most significant caveat concerns the competing explanations for the relation between ownership and risk-taking for high levels of ownership, and whether monitoring is a key factor (see footnote 14). However, given the monitoring incentives that guaranty funds are designed to create, the potential for contagion in the insurance industry (Fenn and Cole, 1994) and the incentives for consumers, intermediaries, and reinsurers to monitor the risk of insurers, it is not clear that the slight evidence reported here in favor of a monitoring effect should be entirely discounted.
CONCLUSION
This study documents a positive relation between risk-taking by property-liability insurers and insider ownership, which the authors interpret as being more consistent with the risk-subsidy hypothesis than the monitoring hypothesis. In addition, the extent of risk-subsidy behavior is found to be greater for less capitalized firms, as the option model of the firm would imply. Finally, the relation between insider ownership and risk weakens at higher levels of ownership. This last result is the only evidence found of a potential monitoring effect. If monitors pay particular attention to firms with high levels of insider ownership (an observable characteristic), it may be that the monitoring effect mitigates the risk-subsidy effect at high ownership levels. However, this is not the only possible explanation for the result. Other researchers have argued that the relation between insider ownership and risk for any type of firm may weaken at high levels of ownership for various reasons, such as the lack of diversification in the managers' portfolios. The study's tests do not distinguish between the monitoring hypothesis and other competing hypotheses as explanations for this result. This is an area for future research. In addition, further research is needed to verify that the positive relation between insider ownership and risk documented here is in fact due solely to risk-subsidy incentives and not to potentially competing hypotheses. The authors intend to investigate this issue in future research.
The results here appear to have important implications for guaranty fund programs in the insurance industry and financial institution insurance programs in general. As currently structured, guaranty funds appear to provide powerful risk-subsidy incentives that monitoring does not entirely offset. This observation is significant given the intent to design a guaranty fund system that creates proper monitoring incentives. The solution to this problem could be approached in two ways. First, risksubsidy incentives could be weakened. This might be achieved with the radical step of eliminating guaranty funds and exposing insurers fully to market penalties for risk-taking. Alternatively, current flat-rate guaranty fund charges could be replaced with risk-based premiums, as suggested by , forcing insurers to bear the cost of their risk-taking even in the absence of market penalties for risk.
A second approach to dealing with the problem would be to strengthen the ability of outsiders to monitor insurers by improving the timeliness and usefulness of insurance company financial information disclosure. If outsiders were provided with better information, they would likely be able to do a more effective job at monitoring. The U.S. General Accounting Office has questioned whether insurer financial statements provide an accurate picture of an insurer's true financial condition and has criticized the time lags in insurer financial reporting (U.S. GAO, 1991) . One idea that has been suggested to improve the ability of outsiders to monitor insurers is to move from the historical cost approach of statutory accounting to market value accounting. Cummins, Harrington, and Niehaus (1995) argue that market value accounting would provide regulators, policyholders, and others with a more accurate view of the true risk of insurers. Klein and Barth (1995) discuss a number of other proposals that have been made to improve the adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness of insurer financial information. In addition, consumers might have more motivation to monitor if they were more fully educated about the risks they face from the insolvency of their insurer.
Even in the absence of any of these regulatory changes, these results have important implications related to monitoring. Peers and regulators may elect to focus on the observable characteristics of ownership structure and leverage when allocating scarce resources to monitoring activities, since the evidence demonstrates a link between these factors and risk-taking behavior.
